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Re-ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚǁŚĞŶĞůŝĐŝƚŝŶŐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚ ? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The 2003 Health Economics paper by Dolan, Olsen, Menzel and Richardson oŶ “ŶŝŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚǁŚĞŶĞůŝĐŝƚŝŶŐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
framework of six perspectives along two dimensions: preferences (personal, social, and socially 
inclusive personal) and context (ex ante and ex post).  The objective of our paper is to re-think this 
framework.  We ask four questions concerning: the patient, or the user of the treatment; the payer 
of the treatment; and the assessor of the value of treatment; and the timing of the illness and the 
nature of its risk.  These questions refine the preference and context dimensions, and leads to the 
identification of perspectives not classified by the original framework.  We propose an extended 
framework with five preferences (personal, non-use, proxy, social and socially inclusive personal) 
and five contexts (one of which is ex post and four ex ante): since two of these cells are empty, this 
results in 23 possible perspectives.  An appendix presents 11 of these more formally to clearly 
distinguish between them and uses monetary and non-monetary (time trade-off) valuation tasks as 
examples. 
(186wds) 
 
Key words: non-use value; proxy value; social value; monetary valuation; risk and inequality aversion 
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1. Introduction 
dŚĞƉĂƉĞƌ “ŶŝŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽthe different perspectives that can be used when eliciting preferences in 
ŚĞĂůƚŚ ? (Dolan et al, 2003  W hereafter, the  “DOMR ? paper) presents a conceptual framework of six 
perspectives along two dimensions: preferences (personal, social, and socially inclusive personal) 
and contexts (ex ante and ex post):   
 “dŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŚĂƐƚǁŽĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞĮƌƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐǁŚŽŵƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚŝƐĂƐŬĞĚƚŽ
think about. It could be that the question is concerned with: (i) the respondent herself, in 
which case she is being asked for her personal preferences; (ii) people other than the 
respondent, thus eliciting her social preferences, or (iii) both the respondent and other 
people, which involves the elicitation of her socially inclusive personal preferences. The 
second dimension concerns the relative point in time at which the preference is elicited and, 
as a result, the degree of certainty associated with the need for health care. It could be that 
there is uncertainty about whether or not health care will be needed in the future (referred 
to as the ex ante context) or it could be that it is known that health care is needed now 
(referred to as the ex post ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ? ? ?KDZ ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐĞƐŝŶŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ? 
Empirical research on social value judgements that compares across interventions for different 
patient groups, and aims to elicit a social preference, has been influenced by the DOMR framework 
(for example, Gyrd-Hansen, 2005; Pinto-Prades, Abellán-Perpiñan, 2005; Schwappach, 2005; Dolan, 
Tsuchiya, 2009  W also see Gaertner, Schokkaert, 2012).  However, the framework should apply to all 
preference elicitation exercises. These exercises should be clear about the perspective from which 
respondents are being asked to complete the task. For example, in a monetary valuation of a 
treatment, respondents can be asked for their own value for the treatment for themselves, or how 
much they believe each person in society should pay for a treatment to be available to others when 
they need it.  
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Our objective is to reassess the framework critically, and to illustrate its imprecision and 
incompleteness.  First, we set the context to ex post, to examine how to distinguish between 
personal and social preferences, by asking three questions: 
- Who is the patient, or the user of the treatment? 
- Who is the payer for the treatment?  
- Who is the assessor of the value of treatment? 
Answers to these questions result in five preferences (personal, non-use, proxy, socially inclusive 
personal, and social)  W two more than DOMR included.  We then examine the ex ante context in 
social preferences by asking: 
- What is the nature of the future illness? 
Answers to this question result in five contexts (one ex post and four ex ante).  Of the five-by-five 
matrix of possible perspectives, two of the four ex ante contexts are empty when combined with a 
personal preference, resulting in 23 perspectives outlined in Table 1.  Consequently, in any survey a 
respondent may be asked to take on several roles, which have not always been explicitly defined. In 
the below, we illustrate our extended framework using informal examples in terms of willingness to 
pay (WTP).   An Appendix formally presents 11 of the perspectives, using both monetary and health 
state valuations as examples. We use the contingent valuation method and Time Trade Off (TTO) as 
examples. These are stylised to emphasise what differs between perspectives. These examples can 
be adapted to apply to other elicitation tasks such as Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) or 
Standard Gamble (SG).   
 
2. The ex post context 
In the DOMR framework, who the user (or beneficiary) of the treatment is distinguishes personal 
and social preferences.  Furthermore, an ex post personal perspective means the probability of the 
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ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛown treatment need is one, while the probability that others in society need treatment 
is zero.  In contrast, an ex post social perspective means the ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚis 
zero and ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?need is one.  We argue that a personal preference requires the respondent to 
be the user, payer and assessor (see scenarios (1) and (2) in the Appendix).  Between personal and 
social preferences, the following two preferences are missing from DOMR: 
x Suppose a respondent is asked her WTP to cure an illness that she will not get (and neither 
will anybody close to her)  W the respondent is not the user but is the payer and assessor 
(Appendix, scenarios (3) and (4)).  The DOMR framework would label this a social preference, 
but this represents a  “non-use value ? or  “caring externality ?.  
x Suppose a respondent is asked to ĂƐƐĞƐƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? WTP to cure an illness that the patients 
have  W the respondent is not the user or payer (Appendix, scenarios (5) and (6)).  Again, the 
DOMR framework would label this a social preference, but this is ƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞ
ŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?Žƌ “proxy values ?.   
Furthermore, social preferences concern a social welfare function (as opposed to an individual utility 
function) and should be distinguished from personal preferences by the source of the value  W the 
assessor  W by asking respondents, for example, to imagine themselves as an officer authorised to 
make decisions on ƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛbehalf (Appendix, scenarios (7) to (13)).  Such choices appeal to 
normative views on how society should operate  W social value judgments  W and may invoke 
interpersonal comparisons (Appendix, scenarios (11) and (12)) and/or evaluations of fairness 
(Appendix, scenario (13)).  Such judgements require a detached impartial perspective, which 
translates to the separation of the assessor role from the user and payer roles.   
In DOMR, a socially inclusive personal preference perspective asks respondents to consider their 
self-interest alongside what is best for society. In this perspective, the respondent is one of the users, 
and the users are a subset of the payers (Appendix, scenarios (14) and (15)).   
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3. The ex ante context 
In the ex ante context the illness has not yet happened.  DOMR defines an ex ante context as where 
the probability of illness is strictly less than one. For completeness, we introduce an ex ante case 
with no uncertainty.  The ex ante personal perspective consists of: one where a respondent is asked 
her WTP now to treat a future illness that she will get for certain (Appendix, scenarios (16) and (17)); 
and one where she is asked for her WTP now to treat a future illness that she may or may not get 
(Appendix, scenario (18)). 
Regarding the ex ante social perspective, suppose there is a 5% rate of future illness amongst 
1000 people  W this could mean any of the following:  
Case 1: there will be exactly 50 patients for certain and we already know who they are; 
Case 2: there will be exactly 50 patients for certain but we do not know who they are; 
Case 3: each of the 1000 individuals have a 5% chance of becoming ill  Wex post there will be 
around 50 patients; and 
Case 4: there is a 5% probability that all 1000 people will become ill  W ex post there will be 
either exactly zero or exactly 1000 patients. 
Case 1 has no uncertainty (Appendix, scenario (19)).  It is well known that expected utility theory 
(which concerns personal preferences) does not distinguish between cases 2, 3 and 4: the expected 
number of patients is 50.  Case 2 has no risk at the collective level (there will be exactly 50 patients 
for certain) but ex post outcomes will be unequal across individuals (some will be ill, others will be 
healthy), so this can be used to elicit inequality aversion, controlling for risk (Appendix, scenario (20)).  
Similarly, Case 4 has no inequality across the individuals (all 1000 will have the same outcome), but 
there is uncertainty as to which outcome, so this can be used to elicit risk aversion at the social level, 
controlling for inequality (Appendix, scenario (22)).  Case 3 combines risk at the collective level and 
inequality across individuals (Appendix, scenario (21)), therefore responses will be affected by risk 
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and inequality aversion. The DOMR framework that does not allow these meaningful distinctions for 
the ex ante social perspective is imprecise.  
 
4. Discussion 
We have critically reassessed the DOMR framework of the perspectives that can be used to elicit 
preferences in health, and shown that the DOMR framework is imprecise and incomplete in both the 
preference and context dimensions. We expand the conceptual framework to five preferences and 
five contexts, with 23 possible perspectives.  The Appendix illustrates more formally 11 of these 
perspectives. 
In the preference dimension, DOMR defines the difference between personal and social 
perspectives based on the user (who is or becomes ill). However, respondents can have three roles 
in an elicitation task: the user; the payer; and the assessor. It is possible to elicit personal 
preferences when the respondent is the payer and assessor, but not user, and thereby measure 
caring externalities. Personal-proxy assessments can be elicited when the respondent is the assessor, 
but not the user or payer. Given these, we propose two preferences to add to the three in DOMR: 
the non-use and the proxy. We show that social preference should be defined with respect to who 
the assessor is (respondent as a private individual versus respondent as a decision maker), and not 
with respect to who the user is. 
In the context dimension, DOMR differentiates between ex ante and ex post contexts using 
future events that occur with probability p that is strictly less than 1. We add a perspective for future 
events that occur with certainty.  Furthermore, across the risky ex ante social perspectives, DOMR 
does not refer to the independence of the probability of illness between groups.  We extend the 
framework to distinguish between three risky contexts for a group of N individuals (who are 
currently healthy) with expected patient numbers of n = pN.  
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This highlights the different perspectives that are necessary to elicit inequality aversion 
(Case 2) or (social) risk aversion (Case 4).  If an ex ante social elicitation task includes uncertainty 
then arguably respondents are most likely to assume Case 3 - independent probabilities  W where the 
two aversion types are confounded. 
Our extended five-by-five framework will facilitate comparisons across empirical studies 
with more clarity at the conceptual level, by classifying studies into one of 23 preferences.  Our 
framework is applicable to all preference elicitation studies in health settings and beyond  W it can be 
used to guide empirical study design, and help researchers to ensure that they have the most 
appropriate framework for their research question. The framework provides a set of roles the 
respondent can be asked to take in a preference elicitation exercise and we suggest that researchers 
should ensure that each role is clear at the study design stage. Our framework also clarifies the role 
of risk in an ex ante context.  
Several of the considerations identified by K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ'ĂĨŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?in their conceptual 
framework for contingent valuation studies are reflected in our framework. K ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ'ĂĨŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ?
identify both non-use values and option values as relevant preferences. They question if ex post 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞs are appropriate for cost benefit analyses of a collectively funded 
health care service that should take account of all benefits to society. Our framework includes non-
use preferences, our extended ex ante context dimensions allow for non-use values, and our use of 
risk includes the range of uncertĂŝŶŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇK ?ƌŝĞŶĂŶĚ'ĂĨŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Preference elicitation tasks used by health researchers originally asked for personal 
preferences of patients or public for their own treatment with the trade-off being in terms of own 
money or own health. The area of application for preference elicitation has expanded to include 
ĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ?ĐĂƌĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĨŽƌƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚon behalf of their patients. The type of goods being 
valued have expanded to include public health interventions (Edwards et al, 2013). These can be 
preventative rather than curative, target a broad range of outcomes, have spill over effects on non-
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targeted individuals and include equity considerations. Elicitation perspectives not included in DOMR 
such as non-use preferences and inequality aversion are needed to value these outcomes. Our 
extended framework has better coverage to accommodate the expanded range of contexts in which 
preference elicitation is applied.  
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Table 1: Summary of the 23 ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƌŽůĞƐĂŶĚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶƐƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ 
 
CONTEXT 
Ex post 
Ex ante 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
n n n n n 
P
R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
S
 
Personal 
User 
Payer 
Assessor 
1 1 [empty] [empty] 0 or N 
Non-use 
(N > 1) 
Payer 
Assessor 
n n pN B(N,p) 0 or N 
Proxy 
(N > 1) 
Assessor n n pN B(N,p) 0 or N 
Social 
Member of payer group 
Assessor 
n n pN B(N,p) 0 or N 
Socially inclusive 
personal 
Member of user and payer group 
Assessor 
n n pN B(N,p) 0 or N 
 
Notes 
N: the population of (potential) users; p: probability of illness; n: number of people ill ex post; N=n=1 for the personal preference 
Ex ante, case 1: exactly n known patients will become ill 
Ex ante, case 2: exactly n unknown patients will become ill 
Ex ante, case 3: each of N individuals will become ill with independent probability p 
Ex ante, case 4: all of N individuals will become ill with probability p 
[empty] indicates that the cell is an empty set 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix introduces 22 stylised preference elicitation scenarios from 11 of the 23 possible 
perspectives outlined in the paper.  These scenarios are not intended as templates for preference 
elicitation questions to be used in an actual survey. They are illustrations that convey the differences 
in the user, payer, assessor and timing between the different perspectives from which preferences 
can be elicited.  Each stylised scenario will specify the following components: 
- the timing of the illness and the nature of its risk, 
- the patient, or the user of the treatment, 
- the payer for the treatment, and 
- the assessor of the value of treatment. 
In the below, we will first set the context to ex post, and examine the five preferences (personal, 
non-use, proxy, social, and socially inclusive personal (SIP)), using examples in monetary valuation 
(contingent valuation: CV) and non-monetary health state valuation (time trade off; TTO). Our 
examples are chosen to illustrate the salient differences between the perspectives. We have chosen 
to illustrate these with CV and TTO tasks for simplicity. The perspectives framework would be 
applicable to any preference elicitation task. For instance, a discrete choice experiment (DCE) 
monetary valuation task would describe the good being valued as a bundle of attributes of which 
one is cost, but should still define the timing of illness, who uses the good, who pays for the good, 
and the respondents role as assessor of the good. Similarly, the TTO tasks can be reframed as 
standard gamble (SG) tasks if respondents trade off risk of death rather than years of life in full 
health, or a DCETTO task if the health is described as a multi-attribute bundle and respondents are 
asked to make trade-offs between two bundles of multi-attribute health and duration.  
Then we move on to examine the ex ante context, where for brevity we focus on only two 
personal and four social preferences using CV scenarios. The points made in the ex ante context also 
13 
 
apply to the other preferences (non-use, proxy and SIP) and to the use of other elicitation formats 
such as TTO, SG and DCE.   
It should be noted that the scenarios do not cover all the practical features of an actual scenario 
that would be included in a well-designed preference elicitation survey.  For example, they do not 
refer to payment vehicles (e.g. out of pocket or insurance premium in CV and DCE monetary 
valuations; or time in TTO or risk in SG health state valuations), the routing and ordering (double 
bounded dichotomous choice or bidding game in CV; ping pong or titration in TTO or SG), framing 
effects (including subjective vs objective probabilities), the difference between risk and uncertainty, 
or other sources of bias. These other issues have already received extensive attention in health 
economics, in particular in the CV literature (Smith, 2003; Hackl and Pruckner, 2005; McNamee et al, 
2010; Luchini and Watson, 2013; Ternent and Tsuchiya, 2013). 
Each scenario is accompanied by a formal presentation of what the answer represents.  The 
specifications of the utility and social welfare functions are left as open as possible: the actual 
functional forms are beyond the remit of this paper.  The 22 scenarios are summarised in two tables: 
Table A1 presents 15 ex post CV and TTO scenarios; and Table A2 presents seven ex ante CV 
scenarios.   
 
 
1. The ex post personal, social, and socially inclusive personal preferences 
1.1. The ex post personal perspective 
The welfare effect of a change in health can be measured using compensating surplus (Freeman, 
1993). This builds on the concept of compensating variation, but does not involve changes in relative 
price and therefore is applicable to non-market goods like health.  (Similarly, equivalent surplus 
corresponds to equivalent variation.)  A CV study can elicit the change in income that cancels out the 
welfare effect of improved health from an ex post personal perspective  W viz. compensating surplus.  
14 
 
Here is the example to illustrate the essence of the ex post personal perspective CV question with 
the respondents roles in square brackets:   
(1)   “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞǇŽƵĂŶĚŽŶůǇǇŽƵĐƵƌrently have condition X: what is the maximum amount of 
money that you are willing to pay for a complete cure and be no worse off than in the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůs PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌ A?ǇŽƵ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌA?ǇŽƵ ? 
The objective of the CV scenario in (1) is to identify the level of -ǻyi ƚŚĂƚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶȴhi and holding 
everything else constant, equalises the utility of two prospects so that:  
ui
i(yi,hiX) =  uii(yi-ǻyi,hiXǻhi),  
where ui represents the utility function of individual i; the superscript i indicates that it is as assessed 
by i; yi represents income of individual i; hiX represents health of individual i in condition X; hiXǻhi is 
assumed to represent recovery to full health; and utility is an increasing function of income and of 
health. 
Scenario (1) distinguishes the three respondent roles: user as indicated by the subscript to h; 
the payer as indicated by the subscript to y; and assessor as indicated by the superscript to u. In 
scenario (1) the respondent i has all three roles. In any scenario, the respondent is always the 
assessor but need not be the user or payer. 
An ex post personal TTO scenario that corresponds to (1) can be represented as: 
(2)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞǇŽƵĂŶĚŽŶůǇǇŽƵĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶX: what is the maximum number of 
years of life in full health that you are willing to give up for a complete cure and be no 
ǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůddK PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?
assessor = you] 
,ĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂƚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇƵƐĞ “ŚĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂƚĞX ?ĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĨǇĂĚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞůǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞ
ƵƐĞ “ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶX ?ŽĨŶŽƐƉĞĐŝĨied duration for comparability with CV. When translating a CV task into 
a TTO task, we do not follow all the TTO conventions for two pragmatic reasons: if health state X is 
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specified for 10 years (for example) ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĂ “ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĐƵƌĞ ? as it is in the 
CV scenarios (a complete cure should not only achieve full health but also full life expectancy given 
current age); and we do not specify duration at any level because later example scenarios become 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝǀĞĚ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ǁŚĞŶƵƐĞƌA?ƉĂǇĞƌ ? ? 
Using the same formula above, this time, y represents years of life; and h represents health 
related quality of life.  The objective of the TTO scenario is to identify the size of -ȴyi that equalises 
the utility of two prospects captured by the formula, gŝǀĞŶȴhi and holding everything else (including 
income) constant.   
The wording of scenarios (1) and (2) does not exactly match the formula.  The formula neutrally 
equates two outcomes, one with relatively high y and low h, and another with relatively low y and 
high h, without indicating how these outcomes occur.  The verbal scenarios, on the other hand, 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ “ǇŽƵ ?ĂƌĞŝŶǀŝƚĞĚƚŽŐŝǀĞƵƉƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨǀĂůƵĞ ?-ȴyi) in exchange for a complete cure 
 ?A?ȴhi).  In order to make the hypothetical scenarios mimic an actual market transaction, CV studies 
ƚĞŶĚƚŽĨĂǀŽƵƌƐƵĐŚ “ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ǁŽƌĚŝŶŐ ?ƌŐƵĂďůǇĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ-based wording, especially in 
health state valuation studies, may be susceptible to bias because it may invoke loss aversion or 
regret minimisation.  With this caveat, we will continue to use exchange-based wording in our 
stylised scenarios, because it better facilitates the distinction between the user, the payer and the 
assessor roles than more neutral wording. 
If the respondent is not the user, but remains the payer and assessor we have:   
(3)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum amount of money that you are willing to pay for 
a complete cure for those who have X ĂŶĚďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
[ex post personal non-ƵƐĞs PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌA?ǇŽƵ ? 
ui
i(yi,hjX) =  uii(yi-ǻyi,hjXǻhj), i j 
16 
 
The user (j) may be one person, or more.  Everything else (such as i ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚŽƌj ?ƐŝŶĐŽŵĞ ?is 
assumed to stay constant.  Scenario (3) ŚĂƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞůŝĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŶŽŶ-ƵƐĞǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?
Non-use values concern goods, for example, in a remote location that the respondent does not 
benefit from the use of directly.  The valuation of non-use values separates the user and assessor 
roles; but not the payer and assessor roles.  When the objective of the exercise is to estimate a 
non-use value in the form of individual compensating (or equivalent) surplus, then it is necessary 
that the payer role remains with the assessor role as in scenario (3).  The term non-use value is 
hardly used in health economics, but such a scenario would elicit  “caring externalities ?. This 
perspective is useful when valuing public preferences for prevention or treatment of illnesses that 
the at least some of the population will never get. For example, population valuation of a prostate 
ĐĂŶĐĞƌƐĐƌĞĞŶŝŶŐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ŽƌĂĚƵůƚ ?ƐǀĂůƵĂƚŝons of childhood illnesses.  
A TTO equivalent to (3) would look like this: 
(4)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum number of years of life in full health that you are 
ǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽŐŝǀĞƵƉĨŽƌĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĐƵƌĞĂŶĚďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
[ex post personal non-ƵƐĞddK PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƐĂŵĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂĂƐ
scenario (3)] 
This may appear unusual and contrived, because the nature of the payment numeraire (years 
ŽĨŽǁŶůŝĨĞ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐůŝĨĞƚŽďĞƐŚŽƌƚĞŶĞĚŝŶĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĐƵƌĞĨŽƌĂ
stranger.  (However, people sacrifice their own health in order to improve the health of others, 
e.g. live organ donors, so a SG may feel less unusual.)  They key here is the contrast in 
transferability of money and health. 
Scenario (3) suggests that a social preference requires further separation of the payer role 
from the assessor role.  But even that is not sufficient to elicit a social perspective.  The below 
scenarios separate the payer and assessor roles but keep the user and payer roles together: 
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(5)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X (which 
you will never get): what is the maximum amount of money that you think they are willing 
to pay for a complete cure for themselves and be no worse off than in the current 
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌŽǆǇs PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌA?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌA?ǇŽƵ ? 
uj
i(yj,hjX) =  uji(yj-ǻyj,hjXǻhj) 
 
(6)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what is 
the maximum number of years of life in full health that you think they are willing to give up 
ĨŽƌĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĐƵƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂŶĚďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
[ex poƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌŽǆǇddK PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌA?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŽƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƐĂŵĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂ
as scenario (5)] 
Here, the respondent as assessor is asked for their view (superscript i for u) on a factual matter: 
the other persŽŶ ?ƐŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽƌǁĞůůďĞŝŶŐ ?uj).  It is another perspective that is not 
included in Dolan et al (2003; the DOMR paper): this might be called proxy judgements, and it falls 
short of social preferences. A proxy preference is elicited in studies that ask health care 
professionals or carers to complete preference elicitation tasks about treatment on behalf of their 
patients. The example illustrates that to build a social preference, the user and payer roles need 
to be separated from the assessor and each other. 
 
1.2. The ex post social perspective 
A social preference is distinguished by the kind of assessor that respondents are asked to be. For 
example, a social perspective can be operationalised by asking respondents to imagine 
themselves being aŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂůĨ ?A scenario 
for an ex post social perspective might look like this: 
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(7)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum amount of money that society can pay for their complete cure 
ĂŶĚďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐŽĐŝĂůs PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?
you; user ؿ payer; assessor = you as decision maker] 
As in (3) to (6) the user is somebody else (n A? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞassessor.  The respondent 
assesses  ? “ǁŚĂƚĚŽǇŽƵƚŚŝŶŬ ? ? ?ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇǁŚŽŝƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚƚŽďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚŝŶ
person (so it is not a personal preference) but society (of N individuals), who is the (immediate) 
payer.  Since society is made up of (and funded by) individuals, the users are likely to be a subset of 
the payers.  The social CV scenario identifies the size of the aggregate willingness to pay (WTP), 
ȈNǻyj, that equalises the social welfare of two prospects:  
WI[u1(y1,h1X« un(yn,hnX), un+1(yn+1,hn+1F« uN(yN,hNF)] =  WI[u1(y1-ǻy1,h1Xǻh1« un(yn-
ǻyn,hnXǻhn), un+1(yn+1-ǻyn+1,hn+1F« uN(yN-ǻyN,hNF)],  
where j A? ? ? Q ?N; I A?j; WIXj >0; and 2WIXj2  
WI represents social welfare, as assessed by an impartial decision maker I, and defined as a function 
of the utility of individuals.  The assessor, or superscript, of individual utility is deliberately left open.  
Welfarism defines social welfare as a function of individual utility as assessed by the individual 
themselves, uj
j
; while non-welfarism uses individual utility, or welfare, as assessed by the decision 
maker, uj
I
.  The scenario is akin to a transfer to the ill within society in a social welfare programme 
(where the ill themselves may also contribute).  Note that the above (even the welfarist version) is 
not an aggregation of individual valuations of condition X captured by (1), and does not assume that 
uj(yj,hjX) =  uj(yj-ǻyj,hjF) holds for each j.  It does not assume that all individuals pay the same amount, 
either.  Because of these caveats, it may be difficult for a respondent to conceptualise aggregate 
WTP (ȈNǻyj) as a measure of treating n cases of X. Studies that aim to elicit monetary social 
valuations should be aware that respondents may have difficulty with this type of task and carry out 
thorough pre-testing. 
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A TTO scenario may look like this: 
(8)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum number of years of life in full health that society as a whole are 
willing to give up for a complete cure for this group and be no worse off than in the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐŽĐŝĂůddK PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌ A?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌؿ payer; assessor = 
you as decision maker; same formula as scenario (7)] 
The difficulty of conceptualising ȈNǻyj may be even greater for TTO than CV, since the idea of a 
total number of years of life given up by society as a whole is unique, and may be confusing 
especially if the number of people in the payer group (N) is much larger than the number of 
people in the user group (n): e.g. suppose N = 52 million and n = 100; it may not be immediately 
obvious that, for example 1 minute multiplied by 52 million people roughly amounts to 1 year 
multiplied by 100 people. Similar to monetary valuations, researchers who plan to use a TTO task 
to elicit an ex post social perspective should be aware of the difficulty that the task may pose for 
respondents.  
An alternative approach to eliciting an ex post social perspective in scenarios (7) and (8) might be 
to exclude the users from the pool of payers, and to match the number of people in the user 
group and the payer group (m).  Thus, for CV: 
(9)   “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum amount of money that another group with the same number of 
people (m = n) in full health can give up for a complete cure for the first group and society 
ƚŽďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐƵďŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĐŝĂůs PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?
ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌ് payer; assessor = you as decision maker] 
And, for TTO: 
(10) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum number of years of life in full health that another group with the 
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same number of people (m = n) can give up for a complete cure for the first group and 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƚŽďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐƵďŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĐŝĂůddK P
ƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌ് payer; assessor = you as decision maker] 
The objective here is to identify the size of ȈNǻyj that equalises the social welfare of two 
prospects (N > n + m): 
WI[u1(y1,h1X« un(yn,hnX), un+1(yn+1,hn+1F«uN(yN,hNF)] =  WI[u1(y1,h1X+ǻh1« 
un(yn,hnX+ǻhn), un+1(yn+1-ǻyn+1,h n+1F« un+m(yn+m-ǻyn+m,hn+mF), un+m+1(y n+m+1,h n+m+1F«
uN(yN,hNF)] 
As with scenario (7), the assessment by the respondents concerns WI: i.e. whether society is no 
worse off.  
 
1.3 Person trade off and budget pie applications 
If the numeraire of scenario (10) is changed from the number of years of life to the number of 
lives then this will result in a variant of the person trade-off scenario (PTO; Patrick et al, 1973; 
Murray, Lopez, 1997): 
(11) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people (not including you) who currently have condition X: what do 
you think is the maximum number of lives in full health (m) that another group of people 
can give up for a complete cure for the first group and society to be no worse off than in 
ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐƵďŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĐŝĂůWdK PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌ് 
payer; assessor = you as decision maker; same formula as scenarios (9) and (10)] 
The PTO scenario identifies the size of the second group (m A? n) that equalises the social welfare of 
two prospects in the formula immediately above, but where yj-ǻyj now indicates being dead 
(notwithstanding hjF).  Some variants of the PTO do not compare condition X against full health, but 
against another condition (Nord, 1992).  This would generate the relative value of one condition 
21 
 
against another.  An actual PTO will contrast treating one group versus the other and a PTO scenario 
that builds on the framing of the preceding scenarios (in terms of compensating surplus) might look 
like this:   
(12) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn people who currently have condition Xn: what do you think is the 
maximum size (m) that another group of people who acquire condition Xm can be if the 
ĨŝƌƐƚŐƌŽƵƉŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĐƵƌĞĚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝƐŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
 ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐƵďŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞWdK PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌ് payer; assessor = 
you as decision maker] 
The respondent is in neither group.  The objective here is to find the number m that would 
equalise the social welfare of two prospects, given n and where N A?n + m: 
WI[u1(h1Xn« un(hnXn), un+1(hn+1F«uN(hNF)] =  WI[u1(h1Xn+ǻh1n), « un(hnXn+ǻhnn), 
un+1(h n+1F-ǻhn+1m« un+m(hn+mF-ǻhn+mm), un+m+1(h n+m+1F«uN(hNF)] 
Here, hjXn+ǻhjn equals hjF, and yj is assumed to be constant throughout and therefore dropped. 
Note that these examples of PTO elicit compensating surplus, where the tasks equate a health 
state improvement for group n with a reduction in health state or life years for group m. These 
are different from typical PTO tasks in the literature that elicit equivalent surplus, by equating 
health state improvements for one group with health state improvements for another group of a 
different size with a different health condition, instead. However, the examples emphasise the 
role a respondent has to take in an elicitation task for it to elicit a social perspective.  
When cost per person is assumed to be the same across the two groups, the scenario becomes 
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽĂ “ďƵĚŐĞƚƉŝĞ ?ƚĂƐŬƚŚĂƚĂƐŬƐƌĞƐƉŽndents to allocate a finite health care budget across 
competing treatments, to elicit their relative values.  A budget pie scenario is framed in terms of the 
proportion of resources allocated to one treatment over the other, and thus of the number of 
people to be treated from each group (n + m = constant).  But a (somewhat contrived) budget 
allocation scenario that is framed to match the PTO formula above might look like this: 
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(13) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚǁŽŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨĞƋƵĂůƐŝǌĞǁŚŽĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽns Xn 
and Xm respectively, which cost the same per patient to treat, and not enough resources to 
treat everybody: what do you think is the combination of the number of people from each 
group to treat that would make treating either group equally good for sŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚ
ƐƵďŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĐŝĂůďƵĚŐĞƚƉŝĞ PƵƐĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƉĂǇĞƌA?ǇŽƵ ?ƵƐĞƌ് payer; assessor = you as 
decision maker; same formula as scenario (12); n + m = constant] 
Where a budget pie task is framed as a choice between two competing health improvements to 
one group versus another group, then this would elicit an equivalent surplus.  If the respondent, 
instead, perceives the task as one where a reduction in health improvement for one group is 
compensated by an increase in health improvement to the other group, then the task will elicit a 
compensating surplus. 
The last two scenarios (12) and (13) illustrate that in social preference elicitation tasks that 
separate the user and the payer, the trade-off need not be across two different goods (viz. money vs 
health; or survival vs health related quality of life) and can be across the same good (health) of 
different people, which allows the comparison between the social value of a unit of health to one 
group relative to another. 
 
1.4. The ex post socially inclusive personal perspective 
dŚĞKDZƉĂƉĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚŝŶĂƐŽĐŝĂůůǇŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? “ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐĂƐŬĞĚƚŽ
consider her own self-ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶDĞŶǌĞů
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ “ďŽƚŚǇŽƵƌŽǁŶƐĞůĨ-interest and what you 
ƚŚŝŶŬŝƐďĞƐƚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?,ĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĞǆƉŽƐƚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƚhat adapts scenario (7): 
(14)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞa group of n people including you currently have condition X: what do you think 
is the maximum amount of money that society can pay for a complete cure and be no 
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worse off than in ƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚƐŽĐŝĂůůǇŝŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůs PƵƐĞƌƐד 
you; payers ـ users; assessor = you as an individual and as a decision maker] 
Under the socially inclusive personal perspective, the assessor is one of the users, and the users are a 
subset of the payers as in (7).  The DOMR framework assumes that preference elicited from a fully 
personal perspective (1) and fully social perspective (7) will differ and the response to (14) will lie 
between these two.  So, it may be possible to represent scenario (14) by introducing a relative 
weight (ɲ) to capture this balance between scenarios (1) and (7): Į:I[u« uN] + (1-Į)uii.  But within 
a range from ɲ = 0 (identical to uii) to ɲ = 1 (identical to WI), there is no guidance on what value this 
relative weight should take.  A serious problem with eliciting the socially inclusive personal 
perspective is that unless responses to (1) and (7) are also elicited from the same respondents, there 
will be no way of gauging the relative weight (ɲ) that each respondent gives self-interest and 
interests of others in (14). 
A non-monetary valuation scenario using a TTO task to elicit a socially inclusive personal 
perspective might be built from (14) and (8), and look like this: 
(15) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞa group of n people including you currently have condition X: what do you think is 
the maximum number of years of life in full health that society as a whole can give up for a 
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĐƵƌĞĨŽƌǇŽƵƌŐƌŽƵƉĂŶĚďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆƉŽƐƚ
socially inclusive personal TTO: users ד you; payers ـ users; assessor = you as an individual 
and as a decision maker] 
The points made for (14) apply to (15). The valuation in (15) using socially inclusive personal TTO 
should lie between the valuations in the personal TTO (2) and the social TTO (8). 
The social perspective tasks that asked about two different subgroups of individuals such as 
scenarios (9) to (13) are not possible in an ex post socially inclusive personal perspective, because in 
order for the assessor to be able to contrast the benefits to the user and the costs to the payer 
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without bias, she needs to be a member of both the user group and the payer group. Scenarios (9) to 
(13) do not allow this because they separate the user group from the payer group. 
 
2. The ex ante personal and social preferences 
Let us now move on to the context dimension and examine the ex ante context under personal, and 
social preferences.  For simplicity, all the scenarios in this section are for CV tasks, but it is possible 
to construct equivalent TTO tasks for these in the same way as we have done in section 1 above. The 
seven ex ante scenarios discussed in this section are summarised in Table A2.  When a future 
prospect needs to be assessed, this can be done either before the event on the basis of expected 
outcomes (ex ante), or after the event with respect to the realised outcomes (ex post).   
In the paper ǁĞĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĨŽƵƌ “ĐĂƐĞƐ ?. Each can be illustrated using an example involving N 
individuals (none of whom are currently ill), and expected patient numbers of n = pN.  DOMR 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŶƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƉŽƐƚǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ “ƚŚĞ relative point in time at which the 
ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐĞůŝĐŝƚĞĚ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?and imposes risk. As we show below, a future event does not have to 
involve risk, therefore, we add case 1, a future, ex ante context with no risk:  
Case 1: n known individuals will become ill and the rest will remain healthy; this might be 
thought of as a set of n ĐĂƌĚƐĞĂĐŚǁŝƚŚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŶĂŵĞŽŶŝƚ Wthere will be n patients for 
certain who are known beforehand but not yet ill. 
DOMR also introduces risk of illness in a population without reference to the independence of 
probability of illness across members of the population. Cases 2-4 illustrate three possible 
probability correlations where p<1: 
Case 2: randomly selected n people from N will become ill and the rest will remain healthy; here, 
there is an envelope containing N cards, where n of them are marked for illness, and each of the 
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N individuals takes a draw, with no replacement W ex post there will be exactly n patients, 
although it is not known ex ante which individuals it will be; 
Case 3: each of the N individuals have an independent probably p of becoming ill or otherwise 
remaining healthy; each of the N individuals takes a draw from the above envelope, with 
replacement   W ex ante the expected number of patients is n, while the number ex post will 
follow a binomial distribution B(N,p) with mean of n; 
Case 4: with probability p all individuals will become ill; otherwise all individuals will remain 
healthy; just one draw is taken from the same envelope for the whole group  W ex ante the 
expected number of patients is n, while ex post it will be either zero or N, and never actually n. 
 
2.1. The ex ante personal perspective 
Assuming individuals are selfish and are not affected by the health of others, a personal version of 
these four cases, from individual i ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƌĞĚƵĐĞƐƚŽ P 
Case Ia: individual i will not become ill  W as far as i alone is concerned, there will be no illness; 
Case Ib: individual i will become ill  W as far as i alone is concerned, there will be one patient (i) 
for certain; 
Case II: with probability p individual i becomes ill; otherwise i remains healthy  W the expected 
number of patients is p, although ex post it will either be one or zero, and never actually p. 
Case Ia is not of interest (it is known that the individual will not become ill so the willingness to pay 
will be zero).  Case II is a special case of case 4 above, where N=1.  There are no corresponding cases 
to cases 2 and 3 above, since ex post, the number of patients has to be whole numbers. 
In case 1 (Ib) there is no uncertainty  W so this would not be ex ante in the conventional sense. 
However, the DOMR paper distinguishes ex-ante and ex post contexts with respect to the timing of 
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events. To follow this, it is possible to define CV (and TTO) tasks in which preferences are elicited 
before the event, with no uncertainty.  A scenario for case Ib might look like this: 
(16) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞǇŽƵĂƌĞĂbout to develop condition X with certainty: what is the maximum 
amount of money that you can pay now to ensure a complete cure in the future when you 
become ill and be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and facing the 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚe case I personal CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
 ui
i(yi,hiF-ǻhi) = uii(yi-ǻyi,hiF-ǻhiǻhi) 
For simplicity, we assume zero time preference.  For an ex ante scenario to be meaningfully distinct 
from the corresponding ex post scenario, it is necessary to assume that cure is available only if 
payment is made now. Although DOMR only uses curative examples. In this case, an ex ante context 
is more realistic and more likely to be used by researchers to value preventative interventions. 
Furthermore, scenarios that describe developing the condition and having it cured are cumbersome, 
and it is not obvious that respondents will assume ui
i(yi,hiF-ǻhiǻhi) = uii(yi,hiF).  An example of a 
scenario that values a preventative intervention is: 
(17) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞǇŽƵǁŝůůĚĞǀĞůŽƉĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶywith certainty: what is the maximum amount of 
money that you can pay now for a complete prevention and be no worse off than the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚƉĂǇŝŶŐĂŶĚĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚĞĐĂƐĞ/ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ
personal CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
ui
i(yi,hiF-ǻhi) = uii(yi-ǻyi,hiF) 
However, preventative and curative scenarios have different welfare economic interpretations.  
The objective of the preventative scenario (17) is to identify the size of the payment (-ǻyi) that 
equalises the utility of two future prospects shown, given the size of the potential health loss (-
ǻhi) and keeping everything else constant. In this scenario, the user is not yet ill and the CV task 
elicits an equivalent surplus of avoiding the health loss (-ǻhi), a bad, which makes two mutually 
exclusive outcomes equivalent: to keep the money and experience the illness; or to pay for the 
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prevention and not experience the illness.  This is in contrast to curative scenarios, where the user 
is or will become ill and the CV task elicits a compensating surplus for the health gain (ǻhi), a good, 
which makes the value of two things cancel out: the benefit of the cure and the cost of paying for 
it.  Welfare economic theory predicts that the compensating surplus (variation) of a good and the 
equivalent surplus (variation) of a bad will agree
1
. 
Introducing risk concerning future health in a personal perspective leads to the case II ex ante 
personal preventative for which a CV scenario might look like this: 
(18) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞǇŽƵǁŝůůĚĞǀĞůŽƉĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶX with probability p: what is the maximum amount of 
money that you can pay now for a complete prevention and be no worse off than the 
ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚƉĂǇŝŶŐĂŶĚĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬ ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚĞĐĂƐĞ//ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů preventative 
CV: user = you; payer = you; assessor = you] 
puii(yi,hiF-ǻhi) + (1-p)uii(yi,hiF) =   uii(yi-ǻyi,hiF) 
The answer, or the size of ǻyi, in (18) will depend on: the value of ǻhi; risk aversion or the shape of 
the utility function (ui); and the subjective interpretation of probability p.  In other words, by 
contrasting (18) with (17) ?ƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŽƌŝƐŬĂŶĚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚion of probabilities can 
be examined.  But if the objective of the study is to value ǻhi alone, the ex ante preference elicited 
in the valuation task would be confounded by both risk aversion and probability perception. 
 
2.2. The ex ante social perspective 
Similarly to the personal perspective, it is possible to build CV (or TTO) social perspective scenarios 
set before the event but involving no uncertainty.  These would represent case 1.  If we consider 
                                                          
1
 /ŶďŽƚŚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?tdWŝƐĞůŝĐŝƚĞĚ ?ŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĞtdWĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽŽĚŽƌƚŚĞtdWƚŽĂǀŽŝĚƚŚĞďĂĚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ
different from the literature that compares WTP and willingness to accept compensation (WTA), which 
compares the compensating and equivalent variation of either the same good or the same bad. For instance, 
by comparing WTP for the good, and WTA for not receiving the good. 
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curative scenarios then an ex ante social CV scenario is obtained by modifying the ex post social 
perspective CV (7), and might look like this: 
(19) “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨn already identified people will develop condition X with certainty: 
what do you think is the maximum amount of money that society can pay now for a 
complete cure for this group in the future when they become ill and be no worse off than 
in the current situĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂů ? 
WI[u1(y1,h1F-ǻh1), «un(yn,hnF-ǻhn), un+1(yn+1,hn+1F«uN(yN,hNF)] =  WI[u1(y1-ǻy1,h1F-
ǻh1ǻh1), «un(yn-ǻyn,hnF-ǻhnǻhn), u n+1(yn+1-ǻyn+1,h n+1F«uN(yN-ǻyN,hNF)] 
Since the scenario concerns n known individuals, the subscripts j here identify unique individuals.  
This violates the anonymity assumption of conventional social welfare functions (that what 
matters for social welfare is the set of individual utilities and not the identity of who has what 
level of utility). 
Cases 2, 3, and 4, all have n=pN expected patients. Preference elicitation tasks can be 
constructed for each of these cases. The distinctions between each of the cases is useful when the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛaversion to risk or inequality. Under case 2, there will 
be pN (=n) patients with certainty, although it is not known beforehand who these will be.  So 
while there is uncertainty at the individual level, there is no uncertainty at the social level, and the 
valuation task becomes: 
(20)   “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶp of N people will develop condition X: what is the maximum 
amount of money that society can pay now to ensure a complete cure for this group in the 
future if they become ill and be no worse off than the current situation (not paying and 
ĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬ ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂů ? 
WI[u1(y1,h1F-ǻh1« un(yn,hnF-ǻhn), un+1(yn+1,h n+1F«uN(yN,hNF)] =  WI[u1(y1-ǻy1,h1F-
ǻh1ǻh1), «un(yn-ǻyn,hnF-ǻhnǻhn), u n+1(yn+1-ǻyn+1,h n+1F«uN(yN-ǻyN,hNF)] 
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Note that this formula is the same as the one for scenario (19), but while scenario (19) violates 
anonymity (because the identities of the individuals matter), scenario (20) does not (and therefore 
individual identity is ignored).  Since anonymity means that the j subscripts in (20) do not represent 
specific individuals and at the social level individuals are interchangeable, scenario (20) has no 
uncertainty in terms of overall outcomes  W there will be n ill people for certain. This scenario will 
allow the researchers to elicit aversion to inequality in outcomes, in the absence of risk at the 
society level. 
Under case 3, the health outcome will follow a binomial distribution with a mean of pN.  A 
valuation task in this case can be based on the follow scenario: 
(21)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞN people are susceptible to develop condition X each with independent 
probability p: what is the maximum amount of money that society can pay now for a 
complete cure for this group in the future if they become ill and be no worse off than the 
current situation (not pĂǇŝŶŐĂŶĚĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬ ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ƐŽĐŝĂů ? 
WI[ pu1(y1,h1F-ǻh1) + (1-p)u1(y1,h1F«puN(yN,hNF-ǻhN) + (1-p)uN (yN,hNF) ] =  WI [pu1(y1-
ǻy1,h1F-ǻh1ǻh1) + (1-p)u1(y1-ǻy1,h1F«, puN(yN-ǻyN,hNF-ǻhNǻhN) + (1-p)uN(yN-
ǻyN,hNF)] 
Here, expected social welfare is expressed as a function of expected utility of individuals.  As with 
(7), this does not assume puj(yj,hjF-ǻhj) + (1-p)uj(yj,hjF) =  puj(yj-ǻyj,hjF-ǻhjǻhj) + (1-p)uj(yj-
ǻyj,hjF) for each individual j, or that individuals pay the same amount.  The response to such a 
scenario will depend on: the value of ǻhj; the shape of the social welfare function (WI); and the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇp.  The shape of the social welfare function 
can represent risk aversion, inequality aversion, or both. Since both kinds of aversion result in 
diminishing marginal social welfare in individual utility, the two cannot be distinguished from each 
other using a preference elicitation task of the format in scenario (21). 
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Under case 4, the expected number of patients is pN, but ex post, there will be either zero or N 
patients, and never pN (= n).   
(22)  “/ŵĂŐŝŶĞƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇp everybody (N) will develop condition X; otherwise 
everybody will remain healthy: what is the maximum amount of money that everybody in 
this group can pay now for a complete cure for themselves in the future if they become ill 
ĂŶĚďĞŶŽǁŽƌƐĞŽĨĨƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚƉĂǇŝŶŐĂŶĚĨĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬ ? ? ? ?ĞǆĂŶƚĞ
case 4 social] 
pWI[u1(y1,h1F-ǻh1«uN(yN,hNF-ǻhN)] + (1-p)WI[u1(y1,h1F«uN(yN,hNF)] =  pWI[u1(y1-
ǻy1,h1F-ǻh1ǻh1«uN(yN-ǻyN,hNF-ǻhNǻhN)] + (1-p)WI[u1(y1-ǻy1,h1F«uN(yN-
ǻyN,hNF)] 
This scenario can be used to elicit social-level aversion to risk, in the absence of (ex post) inequality 
across individuals. The distinction between elicitation tasks that take the form of (20), (21), and (22) 
is important. A task framed as in (21) means that risk aversion and inequality aversion are 
confounded. We argue that researchers eliciting ex ante social preferences should use tasks based 
on scenarios (20) or (22) and be aware that they elicit social preferences and either risk or inequality 
aversion.  
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Table A1: Summary of ex post preference scenarios  
preference user payer trade
(b)
 CV
(c)
 TTO PTO BP  
Personal you 
you 
a
cr
o
ss
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
g
o
o
d
s 
(1) (2)   ui
i(yi,hiX) =  uii(yi-ǻyi, hiXǻhi) 
Non-use A?ǇŽƵ (3) (4)   ui
i(yi,hjX) =   uii(yi-ǻyi, hjXǻhj), i j 
Proxy user (5) (6)   uj
i(yj,hjX) =   uji(yj-ǻyj, hjXǻhj) 
Social ה you society (7) (8)   WI[u«n(yj,hjX); un«N(yj,hjF)] =  WI[u«n(yj-ǻyj,hjX+ǻhj); un«N(yj-ǻyj,hjF)]  (d) 
subgroup 
(9) (10) (11)  
WI[u«n(yj,hjX); un«N(yj,hjF)]  
=  WI[u«n(yj,hjXǻhj); un+«n+m(yj-ǻyj,h jF); un+m«N(yj,hjF)] 
same   (12) (13) WI[u«n(hjXn); un«N(hjF)] =  WI[u«n(hjF); un+«n+m(hjXm); un+m«N(hjF)]  (e) 
SIP
(a)
 ד you society different (14) (15)   Į:I[u1«1] + (1-Į)uii 
a) SIP: Socially inclusive personal;  
b) dƌĂĚĞ P “ĂĐƌŽƐƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŐŽŽĚƐ ?ŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚŚĞĂůƚŚ ?s ?ŽƌƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůĂŶĚ,ZYK> ?ddK ? ? “ƐĂŵĞ ?ƚƌĂĚŝŶŐƐĂŵĞŐŽŽĚ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ people) 
c) CV: Contingent valuation; TTO: Time trade off; PTO: Person trade off; BP: Budget pie 
d) WI[u«n(yj,hjX); un«N(yj,hjF)] is a shorthand for WI[u1(y1,h1X« un(yn,hnX), un+1(yn+1,hn+1F« uN(yN,hNF)] 
e) m + n = constant, for (13) 
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Table A2: Summary of ex ante CV scenarios
(a)
 
preference user payer cur/pre
(b)
 Ex post n case CV  
Personal you you 
cur 
1 I 
(16) ui
i(yi,hiF-ǻhi) = uii(yi-ǻyi,hiF-ǻhiǻhi)  
pre 
(17) ui
i(yi,hiF-ǻhi) = uii(yi-ǻyi,hiF) 
0 or 1 II (18) puii(yi,hiF-ǻhi) + (1-p)uii(yi,hiF) =  uii(yi-ǻyi,hiF) 
Social A?ǇŽƵ society cur 
n 1 (19) WI[u«n(yj,hjF-ǻhj); un«N(yj,hjF)] =  WI[u«n(yj-ǻyj, hjF-ǻhjǻhj); un+«N(yj-ǻyj,hjF)] (c) 
pN = n 2 (20) WI[u«n(yj,hjF-ǻhj); un«N(yj,hjF)] =  WI[u«n(yj-ǻyj, hjF-ǻhjǻhj); un+«N(yj-ǻyj,hjF)] (d) 
B(N,p) = n 
(e)
 3 (21) 
WI [pu1(y1,h1F-ǻh1) + (1-p)u1(y1,h1F«puN(yN,hNF-ǻhN) + (1-p)uN (yN,hNF)]  
=  WI[u«n(yj-ǻyj, hjF-ǻhjǻhj); un+«N(yj-ǻyj,hjF)] (4) 
0 or N 4 (22) 
pWI[u«N(yj,hjF-ǻhj)] + (1-p)WI[u«N(yj,hjF)]  
=  pWI[u«N(yj-ǻyj, hjF-ǻhjǻhj)] + (1-p)WI[u«N(yj-ǻyj,hjF)] 
a) See the text for ex ante personal TTO, social TTO, and SIP CV 
b) cur/pre: curative or preventative; N: the population; n: actual number of patients = pN 
c) non-anonymous: the j subscripts identify unique individuals 
d) anonymous: the j subscripts represent interchangeable individuals 
e) B(N,p): binomial distribution with N trials and probability p, with mean of n 
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